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Abstract 
 
This paper aims to explore in a descriptive way the relationship between country level indicators on 
governance and innovation. It explores in detail the association between innovation and governance by 
looking at the relationship between six governance indicators from the World Bank and the innovation 
performance measures used in European Innovation Scoreboard and the Global Innovation Scoreboard 
(Hollanders and Arundel, 2006). The basic methodology used in exploring this link is an ordinary least 
squares (OLS) linear regression model. The analysis has been realized for single countries as well as 
the EU aggregate average.  
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1- Introduction - Importance of good governance  
 
Good governance became the buzzword in explaining good economic performance as well as the 
well being of a society during the last decade ( see Berthelier et al., 2003). Research has been 
usually focused on the role of good governance in promoting different aspects of economic 
performance; let it be economic growth or productivity. There is however, less work done so far in 
exploring the link between the innovation performance and good governance. In general, it is 
agreed that innovation has a direct link to the productivity and studies concentrating on the role of 
good governance on inducing productivity are so far thought to be serving also for this concern.  
 
However, using productivity as a proxy for innovation is at best an inadequate attempt and at worst 
a fruitless one. In reality, “innovation performance” covers a broad range of different policy fields 
including research, industrial regulation, education, employment, taxation, environmental 
regulation, health standards, quality control, and IPR law (Sloan, B.), which results in interweaving 
of policy governance with innovation inputs and outputs and rises the curiosity of finding the link 
between policy governance and innovation performance of a country on the macro level.  
 
The major problem is that such relationships are empirically very difficult to verify and would 
imply a very time consuming, costly and complex research design. A first step, however, might be 
to relate the existing innovation performance indicators (or composite indicators) with existing 
governance indicators. The main aim of this paper is to explore in a descriptive way the 
relationship between country level indicators on governance and innovation.  
 
2- Definitions, concepts and methodological choice 
 
2.1 Measuring Innovation 
 
In very general terms, innovation is defined as the act of bringing a new product into the market or 
the alteration of what is there such that it constitutes a novelty. A more complete definition could 
be found in the Oslo manual (OECD, 2006), which identifies innovation as "a new significant 
improved product (good or service), or process, a new marketing method, or a new organizational 
method, business practices, workplace organization or external relations" (OECD, 2006, p. 46).  In 
other words, innovation is part of the process through which technological change affects the 
productivity and the living standards of different societies ( first ENGIME report, 2003).    
 
In line with the aforementioned definitions, economists so far aimed to measure either the rate of 
technological change or the level and the impact of knowledge spillovers in order to have an 
indicator of innovation. However this is easier to say than to do. It is very unlikely to come across 
with an appropriate indicator for innovation and/or technological change in the literature and we 
only come across proxy measures to grasp the meaning of these concepts. A quite common one, 
which explains the effort of firms and countries in undertaking innovation, is usually measured 
through the resources devoted to R&D. However, this provides only one of the various measures 
those of which would be classified as inputs for innovation. In order to understand how technology 
changes over time, measures that would fall under the category of outputs of innovation are 
needed. Economists have repeatedly used patent statistics as a proxy to technological output. 
However, there are plenty of limitations on this account. Many innovations are never patented, the 
economic value of the patents varies considerably and moreover, the number of patents depends 
more on the level of employment at the granting patenting institution than innovative output ( Halls 
et al., 2001 in ENGIME Report 2003).  
 
In addition to these aforementioned indicators to quantify or proxy innovation, there are some 
recent research attempts aiming to build composite indicators, incorporating different aspects and 
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dimensions of innovation. In our work, two of such tools are identified and will be used1: European 
Innovation Scoreboard (EIS) and Global Innovation Scoreboard (GIS). EIS provides an annual 
benchmark of the innovation performance for the 27 EU Member States and Croatia, Turkey, 
Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, the US and Japan. The overall benchmark is done by comparing 
rankings of the composite indicator, the Summary Innovation Index (SII). Thus SII will be used to 
carry on the exploratory analysis. SII is a score constructed with data for 25 indicators divided in 
five broad innovation areas within and input - output scheme: 
 
      A) Input 
(1) Innovation drivers (inidrv), which measures the structural conditions required for innovation, 
mainly in terms of educational attainment of the population;  
(2) Knowledge creation (inikc), which measures aspects of R&D; 
(3) Innovation & entrepreneurship (inientrep), which measures mainly efforts for innovation at the 
company level; 
 
       B) Output 
(4) Applications (inoapp), which measures the performance, expressed in terms of labour and 
business activities, and their value added in innovative sectors; and  
(5) Intellectual Property (inoip), which measures the achieved results in terms of successful know-
how in terms of patents and other innovative outputs, specially referred to high-tech sectors. 
An average of the two output indicators (inoav) was also calculated in order to see if there is a 
relationship between innovation output and educational benchmarks. 
 
 
Global Innovation Scoreboard Indicators (GIS) were created in order to compare the innovation 
performance of the EU with other non-EU member states (see Hollanders and Arundel, 2006). It 
has similar areas than the EIS but it is composed of less number of indicators. The indicators are in 
many cases from other sources, due to the availability of the data, which makes, to some extent, 
GIS a different measure than EIS. The list of indicators for GIS is presented in table 2.  In the 
present paper only the overall GIS scores will be considered for the relationships.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 This part is a summary taken from Villalba, 2007. Villalba mainly bases his work on Sajeva et al. 2006, p. 9.  
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Table 1: European Innovation Scoreboard (EIS) and sources, 2006 
INPUT – INNOVATION DRIVERS (inidrv) 
1.1 S&E graduates per 1000 population aged 20-29 EUROSTAT 
1.2 Population with tertiary education per 100 population aged 25-64 EUROSTAT, OECD 
1.3 Broadband penetration rate (number of broadband lines per 100 population) EUROSTAT 
1.4 Participation in life-long learning per 100 population aged 25-64 EUROSTAT 
1.5 Youth education attainment level (% of population aged 20-24 having completed at least upper secondary education) 
EUROSTAT 
INPUT – KNOWLEDGE CREATION (iniKC) 
2.1 Public R&D expenditures (% of GDP) EUROSTAT, OECD 
2.2 Business R&D expenditures (% of GDP) EUROSTAT, OECD 
2.3 Share of medium-high-tech and high-tech R&D (% of manufacturing R&D expenditures) EUROSTAT, OECD 
2.4 Share of enterprises receiving public funding for innovation EUROSTAT (CIS4) 
INPUT – INNOVATION & ENTREPRENEURSHIP (inientrep) 
3.1 SMEs innovating in-house (% of all SMEs) EUROSTAT (CIS3)2 
3.2 Innovative SMEs co-operating with others (% of all SMEs) EUROSTAT (CIS4) 
3.3 Innovation expenditures (% of total turnover) EUROSTAT (CIS4) 
3.4 Early-stage venture capital (% of GDP) EUROSTAT 
3.5 ICT expenditures (% of GDP) EUROSTAT 
3.6 SMEs using organisational innovation (% of all SMEs) EUROSTAT (CIS4) 
OUTPUT – APPLICATIONS (inoapp) 
4.1 Employment in high-tech services (% of total workforce) EUROSTAT 
4.2 Exports of high technology products as a share of total exports EUROSTAT 
4.3 Sales of new-to-market products (% of total turnover) EUROSTAT (CIS4) 
4.4 Sales of new-to-firm products (% of total turnover) EUROSTAT (CIS4) 
4.5 Employment in medium-high and high-tech manufacturing (% of total workforce) EUROSTAT 
OUTPUT – INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (inoip) 
5.1 EPO patents per million population EUROSTAT 
5.2 USPTO patents per million population EUROSTAT, OECD 
5.3 Triadic patent families per million population EUROSTAT, OECD 
5.4 New community trademarks per million population OHIM3 
5.5 New community designs per million population OHIM7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 CIS4 data for the indicator on the share of SMEs innovating in-house were not available. 
3 Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs): http://oami.eu.int/ 
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Table 2: Global Innovation Scoreboard indicators (GIS) and sources, 2006 
INPUT – INNOVATION DRIVERS 
1.1 New S&T graduates UNESCO 
1.2 Labour force with completed tertiary education WORLD BANK (WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS) 
1.3 Research per million population WORLD BANK (WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS) 
INPUT – KNOWLEDGE CREATION 
2.1 Public R&D expenditures (% of GDP) OECD, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 
2.2 Business R&D expenditures (% of GDP) OECD, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 
2.3 Scientific articles per million population WORLD BANK (WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS) 
INPUT – DIFFUSSION 
3.1 ICT expenditures (% of GDP) WITSA/IDC (DIGITAL PLANET 2004) 
OUTPUT – APPLICATIONS 
4.1 Exports of high technology products as a share of total exports 
WORLD BANK (WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS) 
4.2 Share of medium-high/high-tech activities in manufacturing value added 
UNIDO (INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENY SCOREBOARD) 
OUTPUT – INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
5.1 EPO patents per million population OECD 
5.2 USPTO patents per million population OECD 
5.3 Triadic patent families per million population OECD 
   
2.2 Institutions and institutional indicators 
 
A sound definition of the concept “institution” is provided by the Work Bank as “institutions are 
humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interactions. They consist 
of both informal constraints and formal rules” ( WB,1998).  
 
The concept is however complex and multi-faceted. Moreover, it can include a broad range of 
areas like political, legal, market institutions as examples of formal ones and norms and societal 
constraints as examples of informal ones. The literature provides a good summary of “formal 
institutions” (Berthelier et al., 2003 ):    
• Political institutions: functioning of political institutions, public rights and liberties; 
• Law and order: safety of persons and goods, management of conflicts within society and 
between the society and the government, external security; 
• Public governance: transparency and effectiveness of action taken by the authorities, 
corruption, independence of government from private actors          ( collusion, State capture), 
independence and level of application of justice; 
• Markets’ operating freedom: share of the private sector in the productive and financial 
systems, proportion of freely-set prices, degree of flexibility of the labour market; 
• Preparation for the future, absorption of technology, aptitude for reform: modalities for the 
diffusion of technology, strategic view taken by the authotorities, management of the environment; 
• Security of transactions and contracts: respect for property rights, contract law, handling of 
commercial disputes; 
• Regulation: competition on the markets for goods and services, on the capital market and 
on the labour market and arrangements regulating competition; corporate governance, supervision 
of the financial system, instruments for social dialogue; 
• Openness to the outside world: freedom of circulation of goods and services, capital, 
persons and information; 
• Social Cohesion: social and regional balance, equality of treatment (by sex, ethnic group, 
etc.) in traditions and in the actual operation of formal institutions, social mobility, solidarity 
(traditional, institutional).  
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The main idea of this paper is to correlate successively the two composite indicators of innovation 
presented above with some indicators measuring the institutional setting of a country. As 
mentioned above, the institutional indicators are too diverse. For the sake of simplicity and 
limitations related to data, this paper will just use some indicators measuring the institutions of a 
country within the framework of the first three categories aforementioned, namely political, legal 
and public governance indicators. This requires restricting the definition of our independent 
variable as “governance indicators“. Governance consists of the traditions and institutions by 
which authority in a country is exercised. This includes the process by which governments are 
selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and 
implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern 
economic and social interactions among them (see the World Bank’s web-site governance 
matters). A governance approach refers not only to the conventional boundaries between politics, 
policies and administration, but also how they are interlinked to each other (ENGIME Report, 
2001, pp.69).  
 
The indicators measuring one or more aspects of governance of a country are various as well. 
Some common information sources from which governance indicators can be obtained are listed 
below (taken from Berthelier et al., 2003):  
 
• Grading by agencies in the political and economic fields (Business Environment Risk 
Intelligence (BERI), International Consulting Resources Group (ICRG), Control Risks Group 
(CRG), Direct Rendering Infrastructure (DRI), etc.) 
• Publications by foundations defending ideological objectives and realized with the 
support of universities or newspapers (Fraser Institute, Heritage Foundation etc.) 
• Indicators produced by NGOs (Transparency International etc.) 
• Publications by research centres (State Capacity Study by Columbia University) 
• Publications by private firms (Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC) etc.) 
• International financial institutions (World Bank, International Monetary Fund, 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development etc.)  
 
The nature of these indicators is highly diverse. They are based either on the collection of 
assessments by country experts or on the results of surveys of representative samples. The data are 
then centrally reprocessed. The geographic fields covered are either the whole world or individual 
regions.  
 
Among all these indicators, a group deserves to be singled out: the governance indicators of World 
Bank from all the rest. This is because the authors compiled the indicators on the basis of the 
aggregation of 6 indicators emancipating from 15 different sources among the indicators listed 
above (Kaufman et al. 1999). On the assumption that the biases affecting these different indicators 
are in part independent, the indicators resulting form the aggregation of these elementary indicators 
must be more robust than the elementary indicators themselves (Berthelier et al., 2003). Moreover, 
the sample of the World Bank Governance Indicators covers a cross-section of 150 countries 
including the entire EU Member and Candidate Countries. The six governance aggregate indicators 
correspond to six basic governance concepts: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of 
Corruption. Box 1 provides a brief explanation for each dimension.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 9
 
Box 1: Dimensions of World Bank Governance Indicators (Kaufman et al., 1999) 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3 Data, Methodology and Limitations  
 
Given the aforementioned reasons about its robustness we have preferred to work with the data 
taken from the “World Bank Governance Matters” database 4. The data for the Summary 
Innovation Index and Global Summary Innovation Index can be accessed via Pro-Inno web-site 5. 
It is important to underline here that in this work, limitations in data availability and resolution 
level allow the use of simple statistical tools and the conclusions that can be drawn from the 
analyses cannot have the detail that one would expect.  
 
The paper is mainly exploratory and aims to give an idea about the possible statistical association 
between the institutional settings of a country on the aggregate level and innovation performance 
of enterprises in that country, which is gathered through aggregated results based on micro surveys. 
We wish to underline once more the drawbacks of building a statistical link between governance 
indicators, only available at macro level, and innovation indicators, built on micro data. The paper 
does not aim to pose the question of whether the governance of an enterprise leads to better (or 
worse) innovation performance of that enterprise at the micro-level. Instead, we attempt to see if 
the governance setting of a country on the macro level has any impact on the innovation 
performance of its enterprises as a whole.  
 
The basic methodology used in exploring this link is an ordinary least squares (OLS) linear 
regression model. As one-way OLS regression models only give a limited evaluation of the 
association, fixed and random effects models were also tried to estimate the relationship between 
governance indicators and SII and between governance indicators and GIS, as widely suggested in 
the literature for panel data analysis (see Mascherini, 2006 for further discussions). However, 
sound explanations could not be obtained by any of these models, mainly due to the sparse 
availability of micro data.  
 
                                                 
4 The governance indicators data set has been extracted on 20th of July 2007.  
5 http://www.proinno-europe.eu/doc/EIS2006_final.pdf  
Voice and Accountability includes in it a number of indicators measuring various aspects of 
the political process, civil liberties, political and human rights, measuring the extent to which 
citizens of a country are able to participate in the selection of governments.  
Political Stability and Absence of Violence combines several indicators which measure 
perceptions of the likelihood that the government in power will be destabilized or overthrown 
by possibly unconstitutional and/or violent means, including domestic violence or terrorism. 
Government Effectiveness combines responses on the quality of public service provision, the 
quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil 
service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to 
policies.  
Regulatory Quality focuses more on the policies themselves, including measures of the 
incidence of market unfriendly policies such as price controls or inadequate bank supervision, 
as well as perceptions of the burdens imposed by excessive regulation in areas such as foreign 
trade and business development.  
Rule of Law includes several indicators which measure the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society. These include perceptions of the incidence of 
crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts.  
Control of corruption is a measure of the extent of corruption, conventionally defined as the 
exercise of public power for private gain. It is based on scores on variables from polls of 
experts and surveys.   
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It is worthwhile mentioning that, we are also encountered with the usual problem of using 
composite indicators to explain complex, multi-dimensional phenomena, those of which are, in this 
particular case, innovation and the dimensions of governance at a country. The indicators used to 
measure these complex phenomena provide an overall picture, incorporating various dimensions of 
the concept; however, they are a simplification of the reality6. To put it in simpler words, indicators 
used in this paper to quantify institutions and governance do not cover the whole essence of the 
concepts, but represent them as approximate as possible within the limits of the data.  
 
As one of our main concerns in this work has been to identify the place of the European Union 
(EU-27 hereby on) in comparison with the rest of the world on the basis of this possible 
association, an aggregate value for the EU-27 is needed. SII and GIS composite indicators already 
provide aggregated values for the EU-257 while World Bank governance data do not present 
aggregated values for country groups. For this reason, a simple weighted average, based on GDP 
weights8 has been computed for the EU-27 as a whole.      
 
Finally, it is important to bear in mind that the impacts of good governance on different areas, 
including innovation, may take some years to be measured. Because of this reason, the results 
attained based on the association between governance indicators of 1996 (the earliest available) 
and SII and GIS of 2005 (the most recent available) have been studied. However, only one pair of 
data is not enough to study whether the impact of governance on innovation has changed within 
time, and in what way. So, an association between governance indicators of 2005 and innovation 
performance in the same year is also presented to give an overview of how it might get stronger or 
weaker with respect to the previous data set.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 See for instance http://composite-indicators.jrc.ec.europa.eu/  for a complete assessment of pros and cons of using the 
composite indicators. Further information is available in Nardo, M., M. Saisana, A. Saltelli, S. Tarantola (JRC) & Hoffman, 
A. and E. Giovannini (OECD), 2005, “Handbook On Constructing Composite Indicators: Methodology And User Guide”   
7 As Bulgaria and Romania became members of the EU starting from 01.01.2007, they were not taken into consideration 
while computing an aggregate for the EU for SII 2006.  
8 Own calculations done by using GDP at current prices in USD, taken from World Economic Outlook April 2007 
database.  
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3- The importance of good governance for innovation: country level evidence from 
indicators 
3.1 World Bank Governance Indicators and their relationship with the Summary Innovation 
Index 
 
Governance Indicator#1, Voice and Accountability 
 
Voice and Accountability is a composite indicator measuring various aspects of the political 
process, civil liberties, political and human rights; by meaning, one does not expect to find a direct 
link to innovation performance. However, the results presented in table 3 show a moderate to high 
correlation between the two composites, for the sample of EU Member States and Candidate 
Countries ( y= 0.364x-0.02).  
 
Table 3: SII and Voice and Accountability (2005)
Source SS       df MS Number of obs 29
Model 0.464508047 1 0.464508047 F(  1,    27) 42.34
Residual 0.296236774 27 0.010971732 Prob > F 0.0000
Total 0.760744821 28 0.027169458 R-squared 0.6106
Adj R-squared 0.5962
Root MSE 0.10475
sii2005 Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t|
voiceandac~2 0.3640365 0.0559482 6.51 0.000 0.2492403 0.4788327
_cons -0.0200227 0.0632205 -0.32 0.754 -0.1497404 0.1096951
Table 4: SII and Voice and Accountability (1996)
Source SS       df MS Number of obs 29
Model 0.481783077 1 0.481783077 F(  1,    27) 46.63
Residual 0.278961745 27 0.010331916 Prob > F 0.0000
Total 0.760744821 28 0.027169458 R-squared 0.6333
Adj R-squared 0.6197
Root MSE 0.10165
sii2005 Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t|
voiceandac~1 0.2132125 0.0312232 6.83 0.000 0.1491478 0.2772772
_cons 0.1631663 0.0358605 4.55 0.000 0.0895865 0.2367460
[95% Conf. Interval ]
[95% Conf. Interval ]
 
 
Table 3 provides the results of the OLS regression between the 2005 value of the Voice and 
Accountability indicator and Summary Innovation Index, 2005. The R2 value in the table is 0.61, 
which falls into the category of a moderate to high association with a 0.01 level of significance. If 
we take a look at the results of the same association (table 4), this time with voice and 
accountability index at the time 1996, the R2 value is more or less the same (0.63) with the same 
level of significance.  
 
More interesting results are observed concerning the behaviour of different countries within our 
sample. Figure 1 shows the position of the EU member and candidate countries within this 
association. It is possible to observe in general the “Four European Models”, Scandinavians on the 
top, Continental European at the middle, followed by new Member States and Candidates 
Countries.  
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Figure 1: SII and Voice and Accountability (2005)  
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Governance Indicator#2, Political Stability/No Violence  
 
The political stability/no violence indicator is a composition of several indicators which measure 
perceptions of the likelihood that the government in power will be destabilized or overthrown by 
possibly unconstitutional and/or violent means, including domestic violence or terrorism. As our 
sample is the set of the EU Member States or Candidate Countries, for which the political stability 
is a prerequisite to become a Member by default by the founding treaties, one would anticipate a 
possibly strong association between political stability and the innovation performance for the new 
members of (or the candidates to) the EU who are still in process of adapting but for the EU-15 
states that have had the political stability for at least some decades, the same association is 
expected to be not that strong. The results of the OLS regressions presented in tables 5 and 6 are in 
line with this assumption. The R2 value is moderate compared to those of the other indicators that 
are presented in this section. Still, in table 6, we can see a higher R2 value for the association of the 
variables of political stability measured in 1996 and SII of 2005.  
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Table 5: SII and political stability/no violence(2005)
Source SS       df MS Number of obs 29
Model 0.268473045 1 0.268473045 F(  1,    27) 14.73
Residual 0.492271776 27 0.018232288 Prob > F 0.0007
Total 0.760744821 28 0.027169458 R-squared 0.3529
Adj R-squared 0.3289
Root MSE 0.13503
sii2005 Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t|
politicals~2 0.2171367 0.0565853 3.84 0.001 0.1010333 0.3332401
_cons 0.228743 0.0448370 5.1 0.000 0.136745 0.3207409
Table 6: SII and political stability/no violence(1996)
Source SS       df MS Number of obs 29
Model 0.40619211 1 0.406192110 F(  1,    27) 30.93
Residual 0.354552711 27 0.013131582 Prob > F 0.0000
Total 0.760744821 28 0.027169458 R-squared 0.5339
Adj R-squared 0.5167
Root MSE 0.11459
sii2005 Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t|
politicals~1 0.2200699 0.0395688 5.56 0.000 0.1388813 0.3012585
_cons 0.2307622 0.0330462 6.98 0.000 0.1629571 0.2985674
[95% Conf. Interval ]
[95% Conf. Interval ]
 
 
The scatter plot visibly supports our aforementioned assumption. The new member states are closer 
to the regression line than the old ones. Still, the four European models can be observed.  
 
Figure 2: SII and Political Stability/No Violence (2005)  
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Governance Indicator#3, Government Effectiveness  
 
The indicator of Government effectiveness is a combination of responses on the quality of public 
service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the 
independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government’s 
commitment to policies. By definition, the degree of effectiveness of a government is anticipated to 
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have a close link to the innovation policy performance. The results of our statistical analysis, as 
demonstrated in table 7 and 8, support this assumption. 
 
Table 7: SII and government effectiveness (2005)
Source SS       df MS Number of obs 29
Model 0.618714037 1 0.618714037 F(  1,    27) 117.62
Residual 0.142030785 27 0.005260399 Prob > F 0.0000
Total 0.760744821 28 0.027169458 R-squared 0.8133
Adj R-squared 0.8064
Root MSE 0.07253
sii2005 Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t|
government~2 0.2495547 0.0230107 10.85 0.000 0.2023406 0.2967688
_cons 0.0867149 0.0295018 2.94 0.007 0.0261822 0.1472475
Table 8: SII and government effectiveness (1996)
Source SS       df MS Number of obs 29
Model 0.532114482 1 0.532114482 F(  1,    27) 62.84
Residual 0.228630339 27 0.008467790 Prob > F 0.0000
Total 0.760744821 28 0.027169458 R-squared 0.6995
Adj R-squared 0.6883
Root MSE 0.09202
sii2005 Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t|
politicals~1 0.1338489 0.0168849 7.93 0.000 0.099204 0.1684938
_cons 0.2401612 0.0237906 10.09 0.000 0.1913469 0.2889756
[95% Conf. Interval ]
[95% Conf. Interval ]
 
 
Accordingly, within 0.01 level of significance, the R2 value denotes a strong association between 
governance effectiveness and innovation performance. The same strong association is observed 
with the index of government effectiveness from 1996, though the R2 value is somewhat lower. 
Figure 3 displays the location of the countries in our sample in accordance with the statistical 
model and sustains the positioning of Social models in Europe.  
 
Figure 3: SII and Government Effectiveness (2005) 
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Governance Indicator#4, Regulatory Quality 
 
The Regulatory quality indicator focuses more on the policies themselves, including measures of 
the incidence of market unfriendly policies such as price controls or inadequate bank supervision, 
as well as perceptions of the burdens imposed by excessive regulation in areas such as foreign 
trade and business development. In fact, the product and labour market institutions’ impact in 
shaping economic performance and specialization patterns including innovation has attracted quite 
a lot of attention recently and more elaborate theoretical and empirical studies are available in the 
literature9. In our work, for the sake of consistency, we will analyze the impact of regulatory 
quality on innovation as in the case of other WB governance indicators. Hence table 9-10 show the 
results of the OLS regressions between these two indicators. In line with the literature, regulatory 
quality index both for 2005 and 1996 is positively associated with innovation index. Figure 4 also 
portraits this association on the country level.  
 
Table 9: SII and regulatory quality (2005)
Source SS       df MS Number of obs 29
Model 0.458489415 1 0.458489415 F(  1,    27) 40.96
Residual 0.302255406 27 0.011194645 Prob > F 0.0000
Total 0.760744821 28 0.027169458 R-squared 0.6027
Adj R-squared 0.5880
Root MSE 0.1058
sii2005 Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t|
regulatory~2 0.3023779 0.0472488 6.4 0.000 0.2054314 0.3993244
_cons 0.0219764 0.0580244 0.38 0.708 -0.0970798 0.1410326
Table 10: SII and regulatory quality (1996)
Source SS       df MS Number of obs 29
Model 0.413427339 1 0.413427339 F(  1,    27) 32.14
Residual 0.347317483 27 0.012863610 Prob > F 0.0000
Total 0.760744821 28 0.027169458 R-squared 0.5435
Adj R-squared 0.5265
Root MSE 0.11342
sii2005 Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t|
regulatory~1 0.2220126 0.0391615 5.67 0.000 0.1416598 0.3023654
_cons 0.1903242 0.0382562 4.97 0.000 0.1118289 0.2688194
[95% Conf. Interval ]
[95% Conf. Interval ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 See Basanini, A. and E.Ernst (2002), “ Labor Market Institutions, Product Market Regulation, and Innovation: Cross 
Country Evidence”, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No.316, OECD Publishing for a review of the existing 
literature on the topic.  
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Figure 4: SII and Regulatory Quality (2005) 
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Governance Indicator#5, Rule of Law  
 
Rule of Law index includes several indicators which measure the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society. If we consider that this also includes protection of 
intellectual property rights by law, it is not a surprise to see high association between rule of law 
and summary innovation index. It is expected that if the transparency and equal opportunities in 
granting a patent in a country as well the framework of the innovation policies overall are under 
the supervision of the legal check, then this will have a positive stimulus on the innovation 
performance.  
 
Table 11: SII and rule of law (2005)
Source SS       df MS Number of obs 29
Model 0.590993834 1 0.590993834 F(  1,    27) 94.00
Residual 0.169750987 27 0.006287074 Prob > F 0.0000
Total 0.760744821 28 0.027169458 R-squared 0.7769
Adj R-squared 0.7686
Root MSE 0.07929
sii2005 Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t|
ruleoflaw2 0.206454 0.0212939 9.7 0.000 0.1627624 0.2501456
_cons 0.1638574 0.0259794 6.31 0.000 0.1105521 0.2171628
Table 12: SII and rule of law (1996)
Source SS       df MS Number of obs 29
Model 0.559817381 1 0.559817381 F(  1,    27) 75.23
Residual 0.200927441 27 0.007441757 Prob > F 0.0000
Total 0.760744821 28 0.027169458 R-squared 0.7359
Adj R-squared 0.7261
Root MSE 0.08627
sii2005 Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t|
ruleoflaw1 0.1651984 0.0190467 8.67 0.000 0.1261177 0.2042790
_cons 0.2208779 0.0236159 9.35 0.000 0.172422 0.2693338
[95% Conf. Interval ]
[95% Conf. Interval ]
 
 
According to the results from our regression analysis, indeed the R2 value for association between 
summary innovation index and the rule of law indicator at time 1 is 0.73 and that of time 2 is 0.77, 
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which means a high correlation with 0.01 level of significance. Figure 5 demonstrates the position 
of countries as to this association, where we can once again observe the four clusters of the social 
models of the EU.  
 
Figure 5: SII and World Bank Rule of Law Indicator (2005) 
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Governance Indicator#6, Control of Corruption 
 
In broad terms, political corruption is the misuse by government officials of their governmental 
powers for illegitimate private gain10. The control of corruption index is a set of indicators from 
polls and surveys that indicates to the level of measures taken against corruption in a country. The 
role of corruption in undermining economic development by generating considerable distortions 
and inefficiency has been a principle research focus especially for the last decades11. In line with 
this argument, we also expect to observe a strong association between innovation and control of 
corruption.  
                                                 
10 www.wikipedia.org  
11 See for instance Kimberly Ann Elliott, ed, Corruption and the Global Economy (1997) or Johann Graf Lambsdorff 
(2007), The Institutional Economics of Corruption and Reform: Theory, Evidence and Policy Cambridge University Press 
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Table 13: SII and control of corruption (2005)
Source SS       df MS Number of obs 29
Model 0.631130763 1 0.631130763 F(  1,    27) 131.47
Residual 0.129614058 27 0.004800521 Prob > F 0.0000
Total 0.760744821 28 0.027169458 R-squared 0.8296
Adj R-squared 0.8233
Root MSE 0.06929
sii2005 Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t|
controlofc~2 0.189243 0.0165046 11.47 0.000 0.1553784 0.2231076
_cons 0.1765895 0.0213105 8.29 0.000 0.1328639 0.2203151
Table 14: SII and control of corruption (1996)
Source SS       df MS Number of obs 29
Model 0.546555231 1 0.546555231 F(  1,    27) 68.90
Residual 0.21418959 27 0.007932948 Prob > F 0.0000
Total 0.760744821 28 0.027169458 R-squared 0.7184
Adj R-squared 0.7080
Root MSE 0.08907
sii2005 Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t|
controlofc~1 0.141757 0.0170783 8.3 0.000 0.1067152 0.1767987
_cons 0.2302578 0.0237194 9.71 0.000 0.1815896 0.2789260
[95% Conf. Interval ]
[95% Conf. Interval ]
 
 
The results of our OLS regressions between summary innovation index and control of corruption 
index of 1996 and 2005 are observed in tables above. Indeed control of corruption shows the 
strongest association with the SII among all the other WB governance indicators. The R2 value is 
0.82 with a significance of 0.01. The positioning of the countries on the scatter plot is along the 
line of the four clusters we have identified with the other governance indicators as well.  
 
Figure 6: SII and Control of Corruption (2005) 
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3.2 World Bank Governance Indicators and their relationship with Global Innovation Index 
(GIS) 
 
To see the place of the EU member states within the world, we use GIS to study the same 
association. As mentioned before, for the EU-27, we use the aggregate value we have calculated 
based on GDP weights. As to the limited space, we will not study the results indicator by indicator 
but just demonstrate them graphically in the appendix part ( See tables 15-26 and Figures 7-12 in 
the appendix).  On the global level, the pictures look very noisy but still we can see that the model 
explains quite a lot of the variance, and the error estimate for EU-27 is smaller than for instance the 
USA or Japan.  
 
3.3 Results of cluster analysis between SII and World Bank Governance Indicators  
 
As mentioned frequently in the previous section, four clusters of the European Social Models are 
observed in the scatter plots gathered via the OLS regression analysis between the SII and each of 
World Bank governance indicators. In all cases, Scandinavian countries are at the top, followed by 
Continental European countries. Then the Southern member states and new member states follow 
and finally the candidate countries are placed. There seem to be few exceptions to this 
classification, like Italy and France performing “worse” than expected while Malta performing 
“better”. To test this assumption statistically, we have run a hierarchical cluster analysis using SII 
and the 6 World Bank Governance indicators. The result of the analysis is presented in figure 14. 
Accordingly, Scandinavian and Continental member states with the exception of France and 
Belgium form a cluster, as well as the candidate countries and the newest members, Bulgaria and 
Romania. We can also see a grouping among new EU-10 members and Italy.  
 
Figure 14: Cluster Analysis of SII and 6 World Bank Governance Indicators (2005)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 20
3.4 Summary and suggestions for future work  
 
The immediate conclusion from the summary results presented all together in figure 15 would be 
that there is a moderate to high correlation between governance and innovation performance. 
 
Figure 15: Regression results explaining the link between governance and SII  
Constant Independent variable 
  
Adjusted 
R2 Coefficient 
T 
value Coefficient T value 
Significance 
level 
(INNOVATION) 
GOVERNANCE             
Voice and 
accountability 
'05 0.5962 -0.020023 -0.32 0.3640365 6.51 *** 
Political stability 0.5167 0.228743 3.84 0.2200699 5.56 *** 
Government 
effectiveness 0.8064 0.2307622 2.94 0.2495547 10.85 *** 
Regulatory 
quality 0.5880 0.0219764 0.38 0.3023779 6.4 *** 
Rule of law 0.7686 0.2208779 9.7 0.206454 9.7 *** 
Control of 
corruption 0.8233 0.2302578 9.71 0.141757 11.47 *** 
 
However, if we consider the positioning of different countries in the scatter plots we have 
presented before and those in the appendix, we could see that to a great extent these results can be 
explained by country-specific factors where the GDP can be thought as one of the strongest latent 
variables. In other words, the correlations might be driven in many ways by the high scores of, for 
instance, Sweden, Finland, Singapore and the low scores of Romania, Turkey or Latin American 
countries. Using GDP/capita12 as a control variable, the good governance might be still observed as 
a driver of innovation performance but not as important as we found previously, as presented in 
figure 16 below. While the association is retained in government effectiveness, rule of law and 
control of corruption; the significance remarkably decreases for the other three governance 
indicators. This suggests that further studies aiming to identify the reasons behind the variations in 
innovation performances of countries should focus on a wider perspective of determinants 
including the socio-economic setting of the sample countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 GDP/capita ( current prices) values are taken from World Economic Outlook September 2007 database.  
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Figure 16: Regression results explaining the link between governance and SII, controlled for 
GDP/capita 
Constant Independent variable Control 
variable: 
GDP/capita 
Adjusted 
R2 Coefficient 
T 
value Coefficient T value 
Significance 
level 
(INNOVATION) 
GOVERNANCE             
Voice and 
accountability 
'05 0.685 -0.845787 -2.95 0.1629816 1.93 * 
Political stability 0.6851 -1.0439 -4.57 0.0872194 1.93 * 
Government 
effectiveness 0.8019 -0.096727 -0.33 0.223084 4.61 *** 
Regulatory 
quality 0.6889 -0.841702 -3.00 0.1360309 2.02 * 
Rule of law 0.7621 -0.028904 -0.08 0.1831109 3.65 *** 
Control of 
corruption 0.8193 -0.005797 -0.02 0.1706873 5.08 *** 
 
 
4- Conclusions 
 
Throughout the paper, we have first defined and came up with some indicators that measure 
innovation and governance. After that, we have tested the association between the summary 
innovation index and each of the World Bank governance indicators, for the years 2005 and 1996, 
one by one.  
 
As a first conclusion, the direction of association in each pair of indicators is positive. If we 
categorize the associations from 0 to .3 (inclusive) as weak, .4 to .6 as medium and 0.7 and 1 as 
strong; the associations between SII and control of corruption, SII and rule of law and SII and 
government effectiveness are strong. For the voice and accountability, political stability and 
regulatory quality indicators the association is moderate. In other words, we can make a hypothesis 
that the presence of an institutional culture in a country helps the country overall and its enterprises 
on the micro level to innovate more, although an analysis based on micro data would add much 
more to this main conclusion. 
 
Secondly, the R2 values of the association of SII with governance indicators of 2005 or those of 
1996 are not dramatically different from each other, but show heterogeneous results for different 
governance indicators. The magnitude of the relation is always positive, while for some indicators 
like voice and accountability and political stability the association gets stronger if studied with the 
value of the governance indicator from 1996 and innovation performance indicator from 2005.For 
the rest, it either stays the same or gets stronger, once the governance indicator from 2005 is used. 
A rough explanation for this might be related to the different nature and address of different 
indicators and their possible effects on innovation policy area. However, with the current data 
availability, we regret to say that it is not possible to elaborate more on this. Another explanation 
for heterogeneous results might be that better governance is usually achieved over a long time span 
and the diffusion of its effects to other policy areas requires even longer time. The existing data on 
governance indicators do not go beyond the 1996.  For this simple reason, we do expect to see 
more sound results concerning the effects of good governance on different policy areas in the 
coming decades. Moreover, the quality of an institutional environment is not characterized only by 
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its relevance at a given moment but also by its capacity to implement reforms. We also need 
indicators to measure the aptitude of an institutional setting towards reforms, in order to study the 
association in a more appropriate way (Aghion, 2006). 
 
Another major conclusion is the clustering of the countries in line with the association that we have 
identified. On the EU level, the emergence of four clusters, Scandinavians on top, followed by 
simultaneously continental European countries, Mediterranean Ring, New Member States and the 
Candidate Countries, confirms similar models presented in the literature (see for example Esping-
Andersen 1990 and 1996, Ferrera, 1996, 1997 and 1999, Sapir, 2005 etc.) and goes in line with the 
hypothesis that the more the economy is based on impersonal transactions, the more important the 
institutional structure becomes for the innovation performance. The new member states and 
Southern EU member countries are in catching up process and/or are more small, self-contained 
and rural communities compared to the Nordic and rest of Continental EU member states, where 
exchanges take place at the personal (non-institutional/informal) level. In such countries, the 
division of labour and level of innovation is limited to a great extent by the small market size, 
unlike the rest of the old EU member states, that are large, complex and open and exchanges are 
carried on a more impersonal basis (which means at a more global level), so factors like policy 
governance might be expected to have a more direct impact. In other words, in the Nordic and 
Continental models, the situation gets more efficient if society manages to create well-functioning 
institutions on each policy account, including innovation ( Berthelier et al., 2003 ). The analysis 
done at the global level, using the GIS, also presents similar clustering for similar economies          
( Latin Americans or Asian Tigers ) still, to a great extent these results can be explained by 
country-specific factors where the GDP is one of the strongest latent variables. The correlations are 
driven in many ways by the high scores of, for instance, Sweden, Finland, Singapore and the low 
scores of Romania, Turkey or Latin American countries. This not only provides a basis for further 
studies aiming at identifying underlying reasons behind variations in innovation performance of 
various countries.  It also highlights to policy makers that wish to boost innovation performance in 
their country that good innovation performance is deemed to be achieved in a more stimulating 
socio-economic environment.  
 
As a last say, as mentioned previously, to elaborate more on the association of innovation with 
governance, we need to have micro-data for both sets of indicators. There are attempts to collect 
micro data for innovation performance however; this can not be applied to the existing macro-level 
governance indicators. One suggestion might be to incorporate some “governance-related” 
questions to the forthcoming innovation surveys done at the EU-level, to enable researchers to 
come up with sound comparable results on the enterprise governance at the micro level and its link 
to innovation.  
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APPENDIX  
 
Table 15: GSII and Voice and Accountability (2005)
Source SS       df MS Number of obs 49
Model 0.237258233 1 0.237258233 F(  1,    27) 8.25
Residual 1.35190906 47 0.028764022 Prob > F 0.0061
Total 1.58916729 48 0.033107652 R-squared 0.1493
Adj R-squared 0.1312
Root MSE 0.1696
gsii2005 Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t|
voiceandac~2 0.1125178 0.0391774 2.87 0.006 0.0337031 0.1913325
_cons 0.3183999 0.0426433 7.47 0.000 0.2326126 0.4041871
Table 16: GSII and Voice and Accountability (1996)
Source SS       df MS Number of obs 49
Model 0.596527234 1 0.596527234 F(  1,    27) 28.24
Residual 0.992640056 47 0.021120001 Prob > F 0.0000
Total 1.58916729 48 0.033107652 R-squared 0.3754
Adj R-squared 0.3621
Root MSE 0.14533
gsii2005 Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t|
voiceandac~1 0.1568687 0.0295167 5.31 0.000 0.0974887 0.2162487
_cons 0.2795065 0.0334927 8.35 0.000 0.2121279 0.3468851
[95% Conf. Interval ]
[95% Conf. Interval ]
Table 17: GSII and political stability/no violence(2005)
Source SS       df MS Number of obs 49
Model 0.271902705 1 0.271902705 F(  1,    27) 9.70
Residual 1.31726459 47 0.028026906 Prob > F 0.0031
Total 1.58916729 48 0.033107652 R-squared 0.1711
Adj R-squared 0.1535
Root MSE 0.16741
gsii2005 Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t|
politicals~2 0.1164817 0.0373971 3.11 0.003 0.0412483 0.1917150
_cons 0.3568779 0.0311789 11.45 0.000 0.294154 0.4196017
Table 18: GSII and political stability/no violence(1996)
Source SS       df MS Number of obs 49
Model 0.456771454 1 0.456771454 F(  1,    27) 18.96
Residual 1.13239584 47 0.024093528 Prob > F 0.0001
Total 1.58916729 48 0.033107652 R-squared 0.2874
Adj R-squared 0.2723
Root MSE 0.15522
gsii2005 Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t|
politicals~1 0.1365893 0.0313702 4.35 0.000 0.0734806 0.1996981
_cons 0.3532027 0.0268578 13.15 0.000 0.2991718 0.4072335
[95% Conf. Interval ]
[95% Conf. Interval ]
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Table 19: GSII and government effectiveness (2005)
Source SS       df MS Number of obs 49
Model 0.926382368 1 0.926382368 F(  1,    27) 65.69
Residual 0.662784922 47 0.014101807 Prob > F 0.0000
Total 1.58916729 48 0.033107652 R-squared 0.5829
Adj R-squared 0.5741
Root MSE 0.11875
gsii2005 Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t|
government~2 0.1873061 0.0231097 8.11 0.000 0.1408154 0.2337968
_cons 0.2102418 0.0308602 6.81 0.000 0.148159 0.2723246
Table 20: GSII and government effectiveness (1996)
Source SS       df MS Number of obs 49
Model 0.970546537 1 0.970546537 F(  1,    27) 73.74
Residual 0.618620753 47 0.013162144 Prob > F 0.0000
Total 1.58916729 48 0.033107652 R-squared 0.6107
Adj R-squared 0.6024
Root MSE 0.11473
gsii2005 Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t|
politicals~1 0.1368797 0.0159402 8.59 0.000 0.1048121 0.1689472
_cons 0.2730297 0.0236285 11.56 0.000 0.2254954 0.3205640
[95% Conf. Interval ]
[95% Conf. Interval ]
 
 
Table 21: GSII and regulatory quality (2005)
Source SS       df MS Number of obs 49
Model 0.624326133 1 0.624326133 F(  1,    27) 30.41
Residual 0.964841157 47 0.020528535 Prob > F 0.0000
Total 1.58916729 48 0.033107652 R-squared 0.3929
Adj R-squared 0.3799
Root MSE 0.14328
gsii2005 Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t|
regulatory~2 0.1831434 0.0332097 5.51 0.000 0.1163342 0.2499526
_cons 0.2262103 0.0405389 5.58 0.000 0.1446566 0.3077640
Table 22: GSII and regulatory quality (1996)
Source SS       df MS Number of obs 49
Model 0.648353585 1 0.648353585 F(  1,    27) 32.39
Residual 0.940813705 47 0.020017313 Prob > F 0.0000
Total 1.58916729 48 0.033107652 R-squared 0.4080
Adj R-squared 0.3954
Root MSE 0.14148
gsii2005 Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t|
regulatory~1 0.190539 0.0334796 5.69 0.000 0.1231866 0.2578913
_cons 0.2651582 0.0337782 7.85 0.000 0.1972052 0.3331112
[95% Conf. Interval ]
[95% Conf. Interval ]
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Table 23: GSII and rule of law (2005)
Source SS       df MS Number of obs 49
Model 0.929871799 1 0.929871799 F(  1,    27) 66.29
Residual 0.65929549 47 0.014027564 Prob > F 0.0000
Total 1.58916729 48 0.033107652 R-squared 0.5851
Adj R-squared 0.5763
Root MSE 0.11844
gsii2005 Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t|
ruleoflaw2 0.1640672 0.0201512 8.14 0.000 0.1235282 0.2046063
_cons 0.2603398 0.0258245 10.08 0.000 0.2083876 0.3122920
Table 24: GSII and rule of law (1996)
Source SS       df MS Number of obs 49
Model 1.01538218 1 1.015382180 F(  1,    27) 83.17
Residual 0.573785106 47 0.012208194 Prob > F 0.0000
Total 1.58916729 48 0.033107652 R-squared 0.6389
Adj R-squared 0.6313
Root MSE 0.11049
gsii2005 Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t|
ruleoflaw1 0.1590078 0.0174353 9.12 0.000 0.1239325 0.1940831
_cons 0.2659845 0.0230506 11.54 0.000 0.2196126 0.3123564
[95% Conf. Interval ]
[95% Conf. Interval ]
 
 
Table 25: GSII and control of corruption (2005)
Source SS       df MS Number of obs 49
Model 0.964240934 1 0.964240934 F(  1,    27) 72.52
Residual 0.624926356 47 0.013296305 Prob > F 0.0000
Total 1.58916729 48 0.033107652 R-squared 0.6068
Adj R-squared 0.5984
Root MSE 0.11531
gsii2005 Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t|
controlofc~2 0.1516755 0.0178110 8.52 0.000 0.1158444 0.1875066
_cons 0.2653723 0.0244455 10.86 0.000 0.2161944 0.3145503
Table 26: GSII and control of corruption (1996)
Source SS       df MS Number of obs 49
Model 0.961899298 1 0.961899298 F(  1,    27) 72.07
Residual 0.627267992 47 0.013346127 Prob > F 0.0000
Total 1.58916729 48 0.033107652 R-squared 0.6053
Adj R-squared 0.5969
Root MSE 0.11553
gsii2005 Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t|
controlofc~1 0.1385096 0.0163152 8.49 0.000 0.1056876 0.1713316
_cons 0.2718829 0.0239461 11.35 0.000 0.2237095 0.3200564
[95% Conf. Interval ]
[95% Conf. Interval ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 26
 
        Figure 7: GSII and Voice and Accountability (2005)  
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        Figure 8: GSII and Political Stability/No Violence (2005)  
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    Figure 9: GSII and Governance Effectiveness (2005)  
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Figure 10: GSII and Regulatory Quality (2005) 
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Figure 11: GSII and Rule of Law (2005) 
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Figure 12: GSII and Control of Corruption (2005) 
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Figure 13: Regression results explaining the link between governance and GSII  
 
Constant Independent variable 
  Adjusted R2 Coefficient T value Coefficient T value 
Significance 
level 
(INNOVATION) 
GOVERNANCE             
Voice and 
accountability '05 0.1312 0.3183999 7.47 0.1125178 2.87 *** 
Political stability 0.2723 0.3568779 3.11 0.1365893 4.35 *** 
Government 
effectiveness 0.5741 0.3532027 6.81 0.1873061 8.11 *** 
Regulatory quality 0.3799 0.2262103 5.58 0.1831434 5.51 *** 
Rule of law 0.5763 0.2659845 8.14 0.1640672 8.14 *** 
Control of 
corruption 0.5984 0.2718829 11.35 0.1385096 8.52 *** 
       
       
Constant Independent variable Control variable: 
GDP/capita Adjusted R2 Coefficient T value Coefficient T value 
Significance 
level 
(INNOVATION) 
GOVERNANCE             
Voice and 
accountability '05 0.5613 -1.108096 -5.24 -0.698375 0.078 * 
Political stability 0.5405 -1.018515 -4.64 -0.0381045 -1.03   
Government 
effectiveness 0.5882 
-
0.2709449 -0.93 0.1190126 2.53 ** 
Regulatory quality 0.5297 
-
0.8914872 -3.15 -0.0024563 -0.04   
Rule of law 0.5896 
-
0.2333098 -0.77 0.1051365 0.014 ** 
Control of 
corruption 0.6069 
-
0.1638439 -0.56 0.1058113 2.97 *** 
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